SUBJECT: 4 Nov. 2016 King Faisal Air Base Shooting AR 15-6 Investigation Summary

1. The U.S. Special Operations Command extends its deepest condolences to the families, friends and teammates of the three U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers killed in the tragic incident that took place 4 Nov. 2016 at King Faisal Air Base, Jordan. The command is fully committed to working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as they complete their criminal investigation.

2. THE INVESTIGATION:

   a. On 4 Nov. 2017, three U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers were shot and killed by a Jordanian Air Force guard while they were attempting to enter the King Faisal Air Base, Jordan, through a known checkpoint.

   b. On 10 Nov. 2016, U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. J. Marcus Hicks, Chief of Staff, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), appointed an investigating officer from U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the 4 Nov. shooting deaths of the three Special Forces Soldiers.

   c. On 16 Feb. 2017, the investigating officer submitted his investigation and findings to Maj. Gen Hicks.

   d. The FBI is the lead agency for the criminal investigation and continues to conduct a separate criminal investigation.

3. THE INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

The summary below briefly describes the overall investigation findings. A redacted copy of the investigation is attached at Enclosure 1. At the request of the FBI, Department of Defense (DoD) and USSOCOM are withholding specific details of the engagement because of the ongoing criminal investigation. The FBI is the lead for the criminal investigation and is the release authority for information about the Jordanian guard and for specific information on the actual engagement.

   a. On 4 Nov. 2016, a Jordanian Air Force guard shot and killed three U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers at King Faisal Air Base, Jordan, as they were entering the gate in a four-vehicle convoy.
b. The Jordanian Air Force guard opened fire on the second vehicle of the convoy with his M-16 rifle, killing SSG Kevin McEnroe and mortally wounding SSG(P) Matthew Lewellen.

c. Within seconds of coming under fire, SSG James Moriarty and another Soldier exited the third and fourth vehicles in the convoy in order to seek cover as the shooter closed on their position. After unsuccessfully trying to communicate to the shooter that they posed no threat, the Soldiers returned fire. While the other Soldier maneuvered to gain a better position, SSG Moriarty stood and fired his pistol directly at the shooter, who was wearing body armor. After closing in on their position, the shooter shot SSG Moriarty twice mortally wounding him. SSG Moriarty’s actions enabled the remaining Soldier to maneuver and engage the shooter and seriously wound him.

d. SSG McEnroe died at the scene. SSG(P) Lewellen and SSG Moriarty were medically evacuated after receiving initial treatment at the local medical treatment facility but died en route to King Hussein Hospital in Amman. Autopsy results show that no amount of medical care could have saved these three Soldiers due to the nature of their wounds.

4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

a. All three Soldiers died in honorable service to their country.

b. In maintaining their position and engaging the shooter, SSG Moriarty and the other Soldier acted with great valor.

c. All three Soldiers were properly trained, equipped and armed and were acting in compliance with all accepted procedures and practices.

d. Multiple rotations of Army Special Operations units had been deployed to the base for months without any incidents entering the base.

e. All team members maintained at least an intermediate language proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic. Prior to deployment, the teams conducted additional language training in Levantine Arabic, specialized weapons training, and advanced medical training.

f. There is no evidence that substantiates post-incident allegations and speculation that alcohol was involved, the Special Forces Soldiers were not complying with established procedures for entering the gate, or the Americans were the first ones to fire their weapons.
SUBJECT: 4 Nov. 2016 King Faisal Air Base Shooting AR 15-6 Investigation Summary

The FBI is conducting an ongoing criminal investigation and is the release authority for information about the Jordanian guard and specific details of the engagement.
### REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER

**Note:** Completed forms may contain personally identifiable information and require handling as set forth in AR 340-21.

For use of this form, see AR 15-6, the proponent agency is OTJAG.

**IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS**

### SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by _________________________

Major General J. Marcus Hicks, USAF, Chief of Staff

(Appointing authority)

on 20161110 (Attach enclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

(Date)

### SECTION II - TIMELINE

1. The (investigation) commenced at Fort Bragg, North Carolina at 0900

(Place) (Time)

on 20161110

(Date)

2. The (investigating officer) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1600 and completed findings and recommendations at 1600

(Time) (Date)

on 20170113

(Date)

on 20170216

(Date)

### SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>NA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enclosures (para 3-13, AR 15-6) Are the following enclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals. (Attached in order listed)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. The memorandum of appointment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?</td>
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<td>c. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?</td>
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<td>d. Explanation by the investigating officer of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f. An Executive Summary, Index of Exhibits, Chronology of the Investigation and lists of all persons interviewed and evidence gathered. (Complex, serious and/or high profile cases)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Exhibits (para 3-14, AR 15-6) a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer attached before the first exhibit?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer (Appendix C-3, AR 15-6)?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded?</td>
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</table>

### FOOTNOTES:

1. Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

2. Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation.

DA FORM 1574-1, APR 2016

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.
The investigating officer, having carefully considered the evidence, finds: [Each paragraph should be one conclusion based on the evidence gathered during the investigation. These findings should provide answers to each question posed by the appointing authority in the appointment memorandum. The evidence that supports each finding must be cited.]

(See attached Memorandum)
SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-15, AR 15-6)

This report of proceedings is complete and accurate.

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(Investigating Officer)

SECTION VII - ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY (para 2-8, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) are:

a) Approved.

b) Approved with the following modifications:

   (1) The following findings of fact are added/deleted:

   (2) The following findings of fact are modified as follows:

   (3) The following recommendations are added/deleted:

   (4) The following recommendations are modified as follows:

   (5) The action recommended in recommendation _______ has been accomplished by _______

   (6) Recommendation(s) _______ is not appropriate for action by this command; however, a copy of this investigation is being furnished to _______ for such action as deemed appropriate.

c) Disapproved.

d) The report is (incomplete), (ambiguous), (erroneous) and/or (specify deficiency) with respect to _______

   It is, therefore, hereby returned to the IO for corrective action as follows _______

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

J. MARCUS HICKS
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR Chief of Staff, USSOCOM

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) Findings and Recommendations - 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

1. (U//FOUO) On 10 November 2016, I was appointed to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the 4 November 2016 shooting deaths of three U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers at the King Faisal Air Base vicinity Al Jafir, Jordan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation served as the lead agency and conducted a separate criminal investigation. A timeline of my investigation is at TAB E.

2. (U) Background:

   a. (U//FOUO) Members of Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alp ha (SFOD-A) 35 (outgoing) deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) on or about 11 July 2016. (Ex. 2, 11) SFOD-A 35’s mission was to provide military training on, and in the vicinity of, the King Faisal Air Force Base, Jordan (the Base). (Ex. 2) SFOD-A 35 (outgoing) had begun to redeploy to Fort Campbell, Kentucky and was conducting a changeover with the advance element of SFOD-A 5 (incoming). (Ex. 2) SFOD-A 35 (outgoing) members were conducting activities in support of the mission on 4 November 2016. (Ex. 2, 12a, 12b, 12d, 12f)

   b. (U//FOUO) Members of SFOD-A 15 (incoming) deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Jordan on or about 17 October 2016 to replace SFOD-A 35 (outgoing). (Ex. 2, 11) Their mission was to continue the training. (Ex. 2) SFOD-A 15 (incoming) members were conducting activities in support of the mission changeover on 4 November 2016. (Ex. 2)

   c. (U//FOUO) All members of SFOD-A 5 and SFOD-A 5 were well prepared, trained, and qualified Special Forces Soldiers. (Ex. 2, 11) Each team member was experienced in operating throughout the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and was proficient in individual and collective Special Forces (SF) military skills. (Ex. 2, 11)

All unannotated redactions are made via 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), and (b)(6).
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

d. (U//FOUO) Both SFOD-As conducted extensive pre-mission training. (Ex. 9) All team members maintained at least an intermediate language proficiency in Modern Standard Arabic. Prior to deployment, the teams conducted additional language training in Levantine Arabic, specialized weapons training, and advanced medical training. (Ex. 9) Members of both teams had previously conducted similar training missions throughout the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility and both had conducted pre-deployment site surveys of the Base and training areas for this mission. (Ex. 2,9) had been to Jordan on two previous Special Forces deployments. (Ex. 11) had deployed to Jordan, Lebanon and Afghanistan on previous Special Forces missions. (Ex. 11) had deployed to Jordan and Afghanistan on previous Special Forces missions. (Ex. 11) All three Soldiers entered Special Forces under the 18X program.

e. (U//FOUO) Groups of trainees were housed on the Base to receive training during scheduled time periods. (Ex. 2) The trainees were clean shaven and wore uniforms to identify them. (Ex. 2) Trainees travelled from the Base to established ranges, via convoy, with members of SFOD-A 35 and later SFOD-A 15. Convoys departed, and arrived, through the Base’s only access control point (ACP). (Ex. 2) Previous training teams were provided a separate ACP to enter and exit the Base, but, at the direction of the Base commander, that ACP was closed prior to SFOD-A 35’s mission. (Ex. 2)

f. (U//FOUO) A Jordanian security officer was stationed at the Base ACP to facilitate identification and transit. If the security officer indicated the vehicle(s) could pass, Jordanian gate guards opened the gates and allowed the vehicles to pass, without stopping or checking identification. (Ex. 2, 12)

g. (U//FOUO) Convoy operations, and local administrative movements, were performed using civilian off-road vehicles, truck and Safari variants. (Ex. 2) Team members had access to the highway / urban version to conduct longer vehicle movements to Amman. (Ex. 2) All vehicles had low mileage and were well maintained, and therefore there is very little probability of any sort of backfires. (Ex. 2) There was no history or indication of threats to U.S. personnel, thus the vehicles utilized were not armored. (Ex. 2) U.S. operated vehicles were familiar to the Jordanian guard force and identifiable as friendly. (Ex. 2) As a result of this incident, armored are now available for use if the SFOD-A deems necessary to mitigate any assessed threats.

h. (U//FOUO) Convoy, range, MEDEVAC, and personal protection standards and procedures were briefed in a daily fragmentary order, and understood by team members. (Ex. 2, 10) All team members carried pistols for personal protection. (Ex. 2) (b)(7)(E) rifles were carried when escorting and instructing trainees. (Ex. 2) The radios were distributed based on ranges and programs of instruction. (Ex. 2) Team members wore body armor when they worked with explosives, rockets, mortars, and when they would blow in place (BIP) unexploded ordnance, but did
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

not wear body armor in other circumstances. (Ex. 2) IAW ODA procedures, had body armor in his vehicle for use during the scheduled 4 November rocket and mortar training. (Ex. 2)

3. (U) Sequence of Events:

a. (U//FOUO) On 4 November 2016, members of SFOD-A 35 and SFOD-A 15 conducted routine weapons familiarization training on a Jordanian military range that was approximately 5 kilometers from the perimeter of the Base. SFOD-A 5 (outgoing) participants include SFOD 5 (incoming) range training participants were The teams travelled from the Base to the range in the unmarked off road version from the training fleet. They departed through the main gate of the Jordanian Air Force Base, as a single convoy, at approximately 0800 hrs. (Ex. 2, 13)

b. (U//FOUO)

c. (U//FOUO)

d. (U//FOUO)

e. (U//FOUO)

f. (U//FOUO) Upon completion of training, the team members returned to the Base in three separate convoys, including returned, without incident, through the ACP at approximately Incident – 25 minutes (I – 25m) and went directly to the ammunition supply point. (Ex. 2, 12)

1 Times stated in the documentary evidence are inconsistent with the time displayed in security camera footage. In order to clearly explain the sequence of events, time reference is based upon video footage of the second convoy’s arrival at the main gate. Video footage show arrival at 1204 hrs. That time will be designated as Incident time designated as “I” time. The time of events following the time of arrival will be
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

4 entered the base without incident.

g. (U//FOUO) returned to the Air Base’s main gate twenty-five minutes later at approximately 1204 hrs. (Incident time) was comprised of five U.S. Soldiers travelling in four vehicles. was driven by with as a passenger; was driven by and was driven by (Ex. 2, 8, 12c)

h. (U//FOUO) All vehicles in followed standard operating procedures for entering the Base. As the convoy arrived, the Jordanian gate guards were in normal posture. (Ex. 2)

(1) (U//FOUO) The opening of the lift gate signaled to that it was safe to proceed.

(2) (U//FOUO) The demeanor of the guards who departed the building did not give any indication of fear or trepidation. (Ex. 2, 12) Consequently, conditions at the ACP appeared normal and the convoy proceeded according to the standard operating procedure. (Ex. 2)

U.S. personnel were not required to stop at the guard shack, nor to show identification in order to enter. (Ex. 2)

(3) (U//FOUO) proceeded through the ACP and stopped in front of the final slide gate that protected the entrance. (Ex. 2, 12, 13, 14) A second guard slid the gate to the side, allowing to pass. (Ex. 2) then proceeded down the entrance road. (Ex. 2) complied with all Jordanian base entry procedures.

i. (U//FOUO) heard the gunshots after he passed the slide gate. (Ex. 7) Noting the crew served weapon on the QRF vehicle, he drove forward to get out of the weapon’s sector of fire. (Ex. 7) then chose to depart the incident location and drove to the safety of the US section of the base to notify others of the shooting. (Ex. 12d)

designated as I+ (the number of minutes following the arrival), while events preceding the time of arrival will be designated as I- (the number of minutes prior to the second convoy’s arrival).
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

j. (U//FOUO) When attempted to follow through the slide gate, while in the guard building, Al-Tawayha fired his rifle through the open side window of the guard building, into the front windshield of CPL Al-Tawayha was within a few feet of and initiated fire.

k. (U//FOUO) There was no military training or gunfire occurring in the area that would have caused CPL Al-Tawayha to respond. wore American styled clothing and hats that made them easily distinguishable from trainees or local nationals who used the gate.

l. (U//FOUO) CPL Al-Tawayha fired numerous shots from his M16 rifle, through the windshield of mortally wounding and likely caused his feet to fully press the gas pedal and clutch and caused to roll forward. (Ex. 5)

m. (U//FOUO) One Jordanian guard had been holding the rope on the counterbalanced lift gate to allow the vehicles to move through. He displayed a relaxed demeanor and an absence of fear, or a perceived threat. His actions indicate that he had no knowledge of CPL Al-Tawayha’s intent and was not complicit in the hostile act. His reactions were initiated with CPL Al-Tawayha’s engagement shots of and vehicle.

n. (U//FOUO) quickly exited and returned fire and later moved to cover behind cement barriers by their driver’s side doors. had a Motorola handheld radio and body armor with him in, but he did not have the time to retrieve either when he exited. (Ex. 2)
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

did not have a radio or body armor in (Ex. 2) Neither had rifles in (Ex. 2) Both men were being fired upon while they exited their vehicles. (Ex. 2, 12)

o. (U//FOUO) Upon reaching the nearby barriers, both men returned fire. (Ex. 2,8) Only seeing a Jordanian guard in front of them, the men waved their arms in the air to gesture they were friendly. (Ex. 2) Simultaneously, called to the guards in Arabic while called in English. (Ex. 2) Their efforts to identify themselves, and de-escalate the situation, however, only served to draw additional rifle fire from CPL Al-Tawayha. (Ex. 2) CPL Al-Tawayha’s rifle fire, and pistol fire, caused Jordanian forces who responded to the scene to fire random warning shots. (Ex. 2) Hearing the additional fire, and realizing CPL Al-Tawayha’s intent, attempted to signal the occupants of a nearby security vehicle that had stopped short of the ACP because of the shooting. (Ex. 2, 8, 12c) The occupants of the security vehicle did not respond. Not receiving assistance, chose to bound across the ACP, to the cement barriers on the right and rear side of This position gave them a better vantage point and created additional distance between themselves and CPL Al-Tawayha, while not abandoning their teammates in (Ex. 2, 12)

p. (U//FOUO) The exchange of gunfire created an atmosphere of chaos and confusion. Jordanian Air Force and Security Guards reacted by instructing others, including a separate vehicle with US Special Forces members to stay away from the area around the ACP for their own safety. (Ex. 2)

q. (U//FOUO) After crossed to the opposite side of the road. CPL Al-Tawayha walked from his position in the guard building to the open driver’s side door of (Ex. 8, 13, 14) He then looked inside the vehicle, in an apparent effort to check for occupants. Not finding occupants, CPL Al-Tawayha pointed his rifle in the direction of new position and moved to the front of CPL Al-Tawayha remained in front of for a short period of time before moving to the driver’s side door of to check it for occupants. Not finding occupants in CPL Al-Tawayha walked to the rear of while he kept his rifle trained on who maintained their position behind the cement barrier on the other side of the ACP. CPL Al-Tawayha began firing as he raced towards in their suddenly exposed positions. exchanged fire with CPL Al-Tawayha while he ran towards them. CPL Al-Tawayha reached first. In what was then a scramble, used his position at the corner of a cement barrier to maneuver to the opposite side from CPL Al-Tawayha. While maneuvered, stood and fired directly at CPL Al-Tawayha. (Ex. 2, 12) Standing within a few feet of one another, CPL Al-Tawayha, wearing body armor, was able to hit with two rounds, mortally wounding him. (Ex. 6)

r. (U//FOUO) standing and firing directly at CPL Al-Tawayha enabled to rush around the opposite side of the cement barrier and to stand and shoot
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

CPL Al-Tawayha with his pistol. (Ex. 8) closed the distance on CPL Al-Tawayha, continuously firing until he fell to the ground and was no longer a threat. (Ex. 2, 12) then kicked CPL Al-Tawayha’s M16 away to ensure he could not reach it. (Ex. 12c) After disarming CPL Al-Tawayha, moved across the road to the rear and outside the ACP. At that point, disarmed the Jordanian guard who had moved to that spot from the counterbalance gate when the shooting initiated. (Ex. 12c). The actions demonstrated valorous conduct and extraordinary heroism in fighting and remaining with teammates while engaging a force that was better equipped and armed.

s. proceeded towards the nearby security guard vehicle that he and had been trying to draw forward. (Ex. 2, 12c) and had diverted from the convoy to conduct a separate training range changeover orientation and therefore trailed by 5 minutes and having been stopped short of the security vehicle’s position, recognized and pulled forward so he could use their vehicle for cover. (Ex. 2, 12c, 12d, 12e) The three Americans then established radio communications with the U.S. and Jordanian forces inside the Base and waited until it was safe to proceed forward through the gate.

t. (Ex. 2, 12c)

At that point body fell from the cab of the vehicle. body did not receive any additional wounds after falling from the vehicle. (Ex. 12a, 12b, 12g, 12f)

u. (Ex. 2, 12f) and moved to the Aid Station, via ground ambulance. (Ex. 2)

v. drove to the Jordanian Aid Station to determine if any Americans were being treated there. Upon learning that was inside, entered the Aid Station and saw him lying on a stretcher next to a wounded Jordanian. (Ex. 12a, 12g) There were no reports of other wounded Jordanians; therefore, it is likely that the wounded Jordanian was CPL Al-Tawayha. remained with while went to the U.S. Aid Station and returned with medical personnel to transfer to U.S. care. (Ex. 12f, 12g) arrived at the U.S. Aid Station at I + 40m. (Ex. 4)
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

w. (U//FOUO) Sustained two gunshot wounds; (Ex. 4, 5) He was treated at the U.S. Aid Station by a (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

x. (U//FOUO) Sustained (Ex. 4, 5) He was also treated at the U.S. Aid Station by a (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

y. (U//FOUO) At approximately I + 80m, a fixed wing aircraft arrived to evacuate to Marka Airfield in Amman. (Ex. 12g) was pronounced dead at I + 95m, before the aircraft arrived at Marka Airfield. (Ex. 4)

z. (U//FOUO) At, I + 120m, was transferred, via rotary wing aircraft, from Marka Airfield to King Hussein Hospital in Amman, Jordan. (Ex. 4) was pronounced dead at King Hussein Hospital. (Ex. 5)

aa. (U//FOUO) On 5 November 2016, bodies were transported from King Hussein Hospital to Marka Airfield, then to Muwaffaq As-Salti Airbase for movement to Dover Air Force Base. (Ex. 4)

4. (U//FOUO) Specified questions in the appointment memorandum:

a. (U//FOUO) Identify all of the U.S. Soldiers involved or present at the time of the incident, and any foreign troops or other personnel present.

(1) (U//FOUO) returned from range training in and were inside the Base at the time of the shooting.

(2) (U//FOUO) returned from range training in was allowed to pass through the ACP and continue through the Base. All others were attacked by CPL Al-Tawayha at the Base’s ACP.

(3) (U//FOUO) were stopped short of the main gate, by security personnel, when returning from training range orientation. The security personnel had stopped as a safety precaution because they were unsure of the threat and overall situation.
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

b. (U//FOUO) What was the duty status of the U.S. Soldiers, and what was their task and purpose at the time of the shooting?

(1) (U//FOUO) On 4 November 2016, members of SFOD-A 15 (incoming) and members of SFOD - 5 (outgoing) were deployed to Jordan to perform a military training mission.

(2) (U//FOUO) On 4 November 2016, (KIA) was deployed to Jordan, subject to official military orders. He was on active duty with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Engineer Sergeant (18C) and was in the line of duty at the time of his death.

(3) (U//FOUO) On 4 November 2016, (KIA) was deployed to Jordan, subject to official military orders. He was on active duty with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Weapons Sergeant (18B) and was in the line of duty at the time of his death.

(4) (U//FOUO) On 4 November 2016, (KIA) was deployed to Jordan, subject to official military orders. He was on active duty with the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Communications Sergeant (18E) and was in the line of duty at the time of his death.

c. (U//FOUO) Identify where each of the Soldiers was located in the convoy, and outline their movements during the incident. (b)(7)(A) was the driver of (b)(7)(A) in (b)(7)(A) was the passenger, in (b)(7)(A) was the driver of (b)(7)(A) was the driver of the last vehicle in (b)(7)(A) (See diagram, Ex. 7) Their specific actions were addressed in the sequence of events section above.

d. (U//FOUO) What were the requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE), and were there any issues of compliance? Team members were not required, and did not assess an existing threat that required, wear of personal protective equipment during convoy operations.

(1) (U//FOUO) PPE was only worn when team members worked with certain explosives, rockets, mortars, and would blow in place (BIP) unexploded ordnance.
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

had body armor with him for those purposes, but could not retrieve it due to his quick exit.

(2) (U//FOUO) In light of the absence of trainees, the lack of known hostile threats, and the lack of indicators of hostile activity in the area, the SFOD-A decision to forgo wearing body armor during convoy operations was rational and reasonable.

e. (U//FOUO) What were the convoy procedures applicable at the time of the incident, and determine whether there were any issues of compliance with those procedures? There were no formal convoy procedures at the time of the incident. Team members discussed and briefed convoy and range operations the night prior to every range and training event in a team FRAGO. Once engaged, SFOD-A members reacted in accordance with Special Operations Forces standard practice and attempted to neutralize the threat while remaining with teammates in the first and second vehicles.

f. (U//FOUO) What was guidance for access control point entry, and were there any issues of compliance by U.S. Soldiers? Team members had access to the Base through a single Access Control Point (ACP). A security officer was positioned at the ACP to facilitate access, but the guard force typically recognized the Team members and opened the gates for them. There were no issues with compliance by U.S. Soldiers prior to, or on the day of, the attack.

g. (U//FOUO) What were rules as to arming of U.S. Soldiers at this time, and were there any issues?

(1) (U//FOUO) Team members carried handguns for personal protection and did not carry during convoy, or range operations, unless trainees were present.

(2) (U//FOUO) Access to an would likely have provided an increased probability of survival in engaging CPL Al-Tawayha, who was wearing body armor and equipped with an M16. The possession of a enabled to engage CPL Al-Tawayha, but a weapon of greater firing rate, precision, and effective range, would have increased the probability of survival and may have dissuaded CPL Al-Tawayha from active pursuit.

h. (U//FOUO) How long had these soldiers been on this mission, and did duration of their deployment have any impact on their readiness, information, training, or in any other regard? Although members of SFOD-A 35 (outgoing) had been deployed to Jordan for approximately 117 days and some members of SFOD-A 15 (incoming) had only been in Jordan for one day, the length of deployment did not have any impact on their readiness, information, training, or in any other regard. Each team member responded to the incident appropriately and to the best of their ability. There are no signs of complacency or a lack of knowledge of base entry standards or procedures.
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

i. **(U//FOUO)** Describe the actions of the Soldiers during the incident. If there is any videotape depicting the incident, identify personnel on the video. A description of the event is provided above. A videotape of the incident is included as Ex. 8.

j. **(U//FOUO)** Identify medical response to the incident and whether there were any issues in rendering appropriate medical care.

1. **(U//FOUO)** U.S. forces operated a level 1 aid station at the Base. (Ex. 3, 4) The aid station was staffed by a U.S. medical evacuation aircraft is staged at the Base during any high risk training, but was not in the area on 4 November 2016. SFOD-A members were available to provide medical care in their capacities as

2. **(U//FOUO)** Initial radio reports of the incident were received at I+ 15m. At some point between I+ 15m and I+ 30m, was removed from the by Jordanian personnel and transported to the Jordanian Aid Station. He was recovered from the Jordanian Aid Station and transported to the U.S. Aid Station at approximately I+ 45m, where medical personnel continued to provide emergency care.

3. **(U//FOUO)** was moved by Jordanian security personnel from his location behind the cement barrier to a U.S. ground ambulance at approximately I+ 35m. received at the U.S. ground ambulance and evacuated him to the U.S. Aid Station at approximately I+ 40m, where medical personnel continued to provide emergency care.

4. **(U//FOUO)** did not know the physical condition of while he was responding to what he believed to be a continued threat at the ACP; therefore, he did not render immediate aid to (Ex. 12c, 12d, 12e)

5. **(U//FOUO)** At approximately I+ 80m, were evacuated from the Base, via fixed wing aircraft, to Marka Airfield in Amman. At approximately I+ 120m, they were transferred from Marka Airfield to the King Hussein Hospital in Amman.

6. **(U//FOUO)** Medical experts determined that was killed immediately by a gunshot wound to the and no level of medical care could have prevented his death. sustained two gunshot wounds; which was later postmortem assessed as non-survivable. also sustained two non-survivable gunshot wounds leading to his death. (Ex. 4, 5)
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

(7) (U//FOUO) The absence of a rotary wing aircraft at the Base resulted in reliance on fixed wing MEDEVAC that took approximately an hour and thirty minutes from time of injury to arrival at the King Hussein airport. Autopsy results show that no amount of medical care could have saved

k. (U//FOUO) Determine the duty status of any soldiers killed during this incident IAW AR 600-8-4, and any other information relevant to line of duty determination.

On 4 November 2016 were deployed to Jordan, subject to official military orders. They were on active duty with the U.S. Army and were in the line of duty at the time of their deaths.

l. (U//FOUO) Identify any military issued equipment that was not recovered and, to the extent possible, determine the cause of the loss. No U.S. military issued equipment was lost or damaged during, or as a result of, the incident. (Ex. 2)

m. (U//FOUO) Identify any training or pre-deployment preparation for this mission, and assess its sufficiency for the deploying Soldiers and units. Members of SFOD-A 15 and SFOD-A 35 were well-led and disciplined. They were sufficiently trained and prepared for their mission. They adequately assessed force protection requirements and prepared in accordance with known threats.

(1) (U//FOUO) Additional, or other, training would not have prevented the deaths of Neither Soldier could have recognized CPL Ma’arik Al-Tawayha’s intent. The extremely close proximity of the shooter to their vehicle did not give them sufficient time to respond.

(2) (U//FOUO) were appropriately and adequately trained to respond to the hostile situation they faced. Both Soldiers secured a protected position behind a cement barrier and attempted to de-escalate the situation by communicating in Arabic and English. Both Soldiers attempted to maneuver to gain a better position without abandoning their teammates.

n. (U//FOUO) What were the emergency procedures in place, and was there any pre-mission planning for such potentialities? Emergency medical procedures were planned for and in place. (Ex. 2, 3) Team members responded appropriately and effectively. Team Pre-Mission Training (PMT) appropriately included scenarios, vehicle movement, marksmanship and language training to address unexpected threats.

5. (U//FOUO) The following findings are in addition to those specifically requested:

a. (U//FOUO) SFOD-A 35 (outgoing) and SFOD-A 5 (incoming) understood the inherent risk of operating with partner forces in a deployed environment and conducted themselves appropriately and professionally. Their expectation that partner nation armed security forces would not fire upon U.S. Forces’ vehicles was informed and reasonable,
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

considering the countless incident-free exits and entries to the Base utilizing this same access control point. CPL Al-Tawayha’s close proximity to the second vehicle in the convoy left with no time to react to the shooting. (Ex. 2, 12, 13, 14) There are no reasonable recommendations that would have increased the probability of survival of Al-Tawayha’s initial engagement of the second vehicle, and the increased distance from the third and fourth vehicles, provided more time to react. (Ex. 2, 12, 13, 14)

b. (U/FOUO) There is no evidence that U.S. Forces failed to fully comply with Jordanian Base entrance procedures. Currently, there is no evidence of complicity amongst the guard force. All indications are that CPL Al-Tawayha acted alone. At this time, the USG does not have any evidence pointing to radicalization by an organization or individual.

6. (U) Recommendations/Sustains:

a. (U/FOUO) In light of the limited ability to react due to the proximity of the initial shooter engagement, although limited, coupled with the above findings, there are a few lessons learned and recommendations that may have increased their probability of survival in their engagement of the shooter, CPL Ma’arik Al-Tawayha:

(1) (U/FOUO) Carry at least one rifle in each vehicle during range convoy operations.

(2) (U/FOUO) Re-open the second gate to the Jordanian Air Base to allow trainers an alternate place to enter and exit; this gate manned by at least one U.S. representative whenever U.S. personnel enter or exit in order to mitigate incidents and host nation threats while reducing the exposure to any operational sensitivities of this program.

(3) (U/FOUO) A rotary wing MEDEVAC aircraft, and crew, be readily available for stationing at King Faisal Air Force Base.

(4) (U/FOUO) Each SFOD-A member be issued a personal Motorola handheld radio to be carried at all times in training and garrison to support administrative operations and security efforts.

(5) (U/FOUO) Team members continue to assess the security situation and use the recently available armored vehicles when warranted.
SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations concerning 4 November 2016 King Faisal Air Base, Jordan shooting

(6) (U//FOUO) A security officer travel in every convoy to mitigate Jordanian Security misunderstandings and dissuade any deliberate or accidental engagement of U.S. Forces convoys.

b. (U//FOUO) I recommend the following practices be sustained:

(1) (U//FOUO) Future SFOD-As deploying to the same mission continue to conduct the same level of intensive, and specialized, pre-deployment language, weapons, medical, and individual skills PMT training SFOD-A 35 and SFOD-A 15 conducted.

(2) (U//FOUO) SFOD-As continue to issue the same attention to detail-based SFOD-A 35 / SFOD-A 15 nightly FRAGOs to prepare team members for the next day’s missions.

(3) (U//FOUO) Continue to maximize consolidated convoy movement procedures to the extent operationally possible.

(4) (U//FOUO) Continue to maintain an fleet of vehicles for SFOD-A use if threat assessment warrants.

(5) (U//FOUO) Continue to conduct the same deliberate and extensive relief in place / transfer of authority and team changeovers SFOD-A 5 and SFOD-A 15 were conducting at the time of the incident.

(6) (U//FOUO) Continue to distinguish U.S. and trainees through uniform, grooming, and other highlighted procedures to mitigate future incidents.

//ORIGINAL SIGNED//
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)6
Investigating Officer
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Exhibit 13. King Faisal Air Base Access Control Point Approach photograph
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All unannotated redactions are via 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, and (b)6.
Tab A.

DA Form 1574-1 - Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer
Tab B.

Investigating Officer's Memorandum of Findings and Recommendations
Tab C.

Appointment Memorandum
10 November 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, 2929 DESERT STORM DRIVE, FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-9110

SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

1. Appointment: You are appointed an investigating officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances of an incident in Jordan, occurring on or about 4 November 2016, and resulting in the deaths of three U.S. Special Forces Soldiers. Your responsibilities as IO take precedence over all other military duties. You have 30 days from the date of this appointment to conduct this investigation; if you need additional time, submit a request through your legal advisor.

2. General instructions: The purpose of this AR 15-6 investigation is to determine the facts of this incident, and to identify any issues that will improve DOD operations and avoid similar occurrences. Subject to the limitations described in paragraph 3, below, you should explore any issues or deficiencies in policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership that might have contributed to this incident. If, during the course of your investigation, you discover information that may require expanding or restricting this investigation, or otherwise modify your instructions, immediately notify me through the SJA, USSOCOM, or directly as necessary.

3. Required coordination: It is important for you to note there is an on-going FBI criminal investigation into this incident, and that investigation takes priority. The AR 15-6 investigation will not impede or interfere with the criminal investigation, and I direct your close coordination with the FBI and any other investigations, to ensure lack of interference. I expect you to work jointly with the FBI and others as much as possible to conserve time, resources and avoid inconvenience for witnesses; whenever possible, you should use witness statements or other evidence collected by the FBI and others. This 15-6 is not a joint investigation with the FBI, and you will produce your own report of investigation focused on issues of special consideration for DOD. I expect you to share evidence to the maximum extent. If you have issues de-conflicting with FBI or other investigators, consult the legal advisor for coordination with other agencies as necessary.

4. Scope of investigation: You are to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 4 November 2016 incident. During your investigation, you will focus on issues important to DOD consideration, including specifically:
a. Identify all of the US soldiers involved or present at the time of the incident, and any foreign troops or other personnel present.

b. What was the duty status of the US soldiers, and what was their task and purpose at the time of the shooting?

c. Identify where each of the soldiers was located in the convoy, and outline their movements during the incident.

d. What were requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE), and were there any issues of compliance?

e. What were the convoy procedures applicable at the time of the incident, and determine whether there were any issues of compliance with those procedures.

f. What was guidance for access control point entry, and were there any issues of compliance by US soldiers?

g. What were rules as to arming of US soldiers at this time, and were there any issues?

h. How long had these soldiers been on this mission, and did duration of their deployment have any impact on their readiness, information, training, or in any other regard?

i. Describe the actions of the soldiers during the incident. If there is any videotape depicting the incident, identify personnel on the video.

j. Identify medical response to the incident and whether there were any issues in rendering appropriate medical care.

k. Determine the duty status of any soldiers killed during this incident IAW AR 600-8-4, and any other information relevant to line of duty determination.

l. Identify any military issued equipment that was not recovered and, to the extent possible, determine the cause of the loss.

m. Identify any training or pre-deployment preparation for this mission, and assess its sufficiency for the deploying soldiers and units.

n. What were the emergency procedures in place, and was there any pre-mission planning for such potentialities?
SOCS
SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

5. Conduct of the investigation.

   a. Use the guidance in AR 15-6, Chapter 3, for conduct of this investigation. There is no named respondent.

   b. Witness statements should normally be written and sworn where possible. Use a DA Form 2823 for sworn statements; if unable to execute written sworn statement, then ensure you have a witness verify the contents of any record of testimony. IAW AR 340-21, provide a Privacy Act statement to a witness as necessary and if you do not use a DA Form 2823. As noted above, you should first rely on witness statements taken in the FBI investigation.

   c. If in the course of your investigation you suspect someone of committing criminal conduct, consult your legal advisor for appropriate rights advisement under Article 31, UCMJ, or the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution. Document any rights advisement and witness waivers on a DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate).

   d. Should you determine in the course of your investigation that a soldier’s status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in AR 600-8-2, you must notify me immediately and consult with your legal advisor, to ensure a flag is initiated against that soldier.

   e. Before beginning your investigation, you will get a legal briefing from the USSOCOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. That office will remain your legal advisor throughout the course of your investigation, and they should be your first point of contact on any issues relating to the investigation. Primary POC and or, alternate POC is

6. Report of investigation:

   a. You will prepare a written report of investigation and attach it as a memorandum to a completed DA 1574-1. The completed report will include:

      (i) memorandum of appointment;
      (ii) completed DA Form 1574-1, Report of Proceedings by IO;
      (iii) detailed chronology of the investigation;
      (iv) index of exhibits;
      (v) all exhibits, labeled and numbered;
      (vi) list of witnesses interviewed, or whose statements you have included;
      (vii) if applicable, proper classification markings for each paragraph, page and exhibit included with your report of investigation;
      (viii) memorandum of findings and recommendations;
SOCS
SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

(ix) unclassified executive summary of the report of investigation.

b. Findings: You will reach findings by preponderance of the evidence. A finding is a clear and concise statement of facts that can be readily deduced from the evidence. In your report, develop specific findings and cite the evidence in support of that finding. If evidence conflicts, make a finding regarding which evidence is more credible and, as possible, explain your resolution of the competing evidence.

c. Recommendations: Based on your findings, make recommendations regarding what changes, if any are needed in terms of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership to avoid similar incidents in the future, as well as any other recommendations your investigation reveals.

d. Submission: Submit your report of investigation to the USSOCOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review. The SJA will engage you with other involved agencies in order to de-conflict any issues with your report and findings of other investigations.

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

J. MARCUS HICKS
Major General, U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff
Tab E.

Exhibits
Exhibit 1.

Federal Bureau of Investigation 302 Interviews

Withheld due to ongoing FBI investigation
Exhibit 2.

30 Nov 16, ODA 35 / ODA 15 Interview Memorandum
MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Interview / Discussion with SFOD-A 35 and SFOD-A 15

1. On 30 November 2016, I travelled to Ft Campbell, KY to interview members of SFOD-A 35 and SFOD-A 15 regarding the 4 November 2016 shooting of on King Faisal Air Force Base in the vicinity of Al-Jafar, Jordan. I was accompanied by .

2. ODA 35 was represented by who were in Jordan at the time of the shooting.

3. ODA 5 was represented by who were in Jordan at the time of the shooting.

4. I started the discussion by introducing myself and explaining my role as the Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer.
   a. I explained that the FBI were the lead investigators and were conducting a criminal investigation of the incident and that the concurrent AR 15-6 Investigation would not interfere with the FBI’s investigation.
   b. I explained that there were a few follow-up questions that I had and did not intend to go over the information that they previously provided to the FBI.
   c. In order to not interfere or counter any instructions from the FBI, asked the participants if anyone had instructed them not to communicate with one another or not to discuss the case. Both teams replied that they had not been instructed by law enforcement agencies not to discuss the case.
   d. The from SFOD-A 35 and SFOD-A 5 stated that both teams conducted this mission...
in the past throughout the AOR. They also noted that neither team interacts with the local populace, nor nothing seemed out of the ordinary that day.

e. When the team would go out for training they would drive vehicles. When required to go out for longer trips beyond the ranges they utilized a distinct more street version The guard force was well versed in the use of both of these types of vehicles.

f. The ODA were equipped with handheld radios and were allocated based on POI and ranges, not on convoy procedures. had a Motorola radio in his vehicle, but was unable to reach it before exiting. did not have a radio in his vehicle.

g. In accordance with (IAW) their procedures, All of the Soldiers were issue pistols and carried them. They were assigned from both teams indicated that there was no loss of personnel or unit equipment resulting from the incident. ODA personnel were not required to have body armor unless they were conducting, demolition, rockets, or mortars training.

h. The personnel were normally the first ones to the range. Their purpose was to ensure the rage was clear of hazards and civilians, such as bedouins roaming the area. Students would wear a uniform consistent with the host nation and were clean shaven. The team instructors would wear civilian clothing with a ball cap, and adopted relaxed grooming standards. The guard force was accustomed to this standard. The Soldiers participating in the convoy were all in distinct and Caucasian therefore highly unlikely to be confused with any of the local populace or students.

i. As verified by video evidence, on the morning of 4 Nov 16, the failed to physically exit his guard shack and verify that US Soldiers were entering the base. typically do not exit their shack to verify the identity of the convoy personnel. Although stated by the Jordanians the correct procedures is for a Jordanian LNO to exit and identify all US and training participants, the gate guards generally recognize the Americans and let them in. A recommendation was made that one soldier should actively ride in the convoy leaving or entering the base as this might mitigate future incidents.

j. There was no evidence of collusion from the guards. This is supported by the fact that the initial guard that removed the anti-vehicle obstacles and opened the gate did not flinch or display any sign that a negligent discharge (ND) or backfire
occurred prior to the rounds impacting the vehicle (see video). He held the rope for the gate and only reacted (changed his body position and foot position) when the rounds started hitting the second vehicle’s windshield and roof as seen in the video. The guard was not wearing a ballistic helmet or body armor. He did not engage from the rear when he had the chance nor did he resist when disarmed him. When the QRF became aware of the situation they maneuvered the vehicle only to support a defensive position and restrict entry to the base versus engaging any perceived threat outside the base. This movement was not made in an offensive posture. As stated earlier they provided suppressive fire support only. The internal Jordanian guard force appeared to be confused by the situation and lacked organization. They stopped everyone from entering or exiting the scene as to avoid further fatalities.

During the engagement, external forces in the barrel truck attempted to keep the from approaching the incident as they were unsure of the situation and believed it was dangerous for Americans.

became aware that there was a problem around the time his vehicle reached the location of the Jordanian QRF (quick reactionary force) vehicle. Unsure of what was going on he maintained his posture in the vehicle.

exited his vehicle, took up a defensive posture and tried to shout in English that they were friendly. Unable to reach his radio, exited his vehicle, took up a defensive posture and tried to shout in Arabic that they were friendly.

There is no evidence of shots fired or loud noises prior to the alleged shooter engaging Vehicle. There was no weapons training or demo training in the vicinity. None of the local military force was involved in any training that could be attributed to a loud bang. All of the vehicles in use relatively very new, had low mileage, and were well maintained, thus unlikely to experience a mechanical malfunction that would cause a backfire.

Clarification on the damage to Vehicle grill area that included wood stuck in the radiator. When one of the Jordanian Captains attempted to render aid and remove from Vehicle the vehicle lurched forward and hit a wood picket fence that was nearby. verified that the vehicle did end up against the fence with a piece of wood protruding from the grill.

and arrived at the ammunition supply point (ASP) ten minutes prior to the incident at the gate. They were alerted that there was an incident at the gate. They headed to the gate and attempted to assess the situation. They realized that was injured on the ground outside the gate. Initially
they attempted to retrieve him but were fired upon from an unknown location. Later they were able to retrieve and evacuated him to the air station. and (18D) provided medical treatment during the movement to the aid station. Upon arrival to the aid station, was prepared for ground evacuation to the airfield with follow on fixed wing MEDAVAC to King Hussein Hospital in Amman.

5. POC is the undersigned at (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) Investigating Officer
Exhibit 3.

Medical Infrastructure Assessment
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: U.S. Medical Infrastructure Assessment for King Faisal Air Base Jordan, Shooting

1. U.S. forces operated a Level 1 Aid Station at the King Faisal Air Base in Jordan. The aid station was staffed by a licensed U.S. Physician’s Assistant and a qualified U.S. civilian medic (former 18D Special Forces Sergeant).

2. A U.S. rotary wing medical evacuation helicopter (MEDEVAC) was staged at the Base during any high risk training, but was not in the area on 4 November 2016. (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

3. SFOD-A members were available to provide additional medical care in their capacities as current/qualified Special Forces Medical Sergeants.

4. The Level 1 Aid Station was equipped with Advanced Trauma Life Support equipment, Advanced Cardiac Life Support equipment and capabilities for basic laboratory evaluations and monitoring. This included a 12-lead EKG, Ultrasound, and ISTAT for basic labs.

5. The PACE plan and contingency operations had been developed to include two forms of direct radio/cellular communication.

6. All medical personnel had prior deployment experience and a regional medical site survey was conducted by the current SFOD-A to include a site survey of the King Hussein Medical Center.

7. Rehearsals were also conducted by the SFOD-A and supporting medical team.

8. MEDEVAC requests were by secure phone with three alternate forms of communication to include internal secure messaging, satellite phone and alternate local cellular phone service.

9. Casualty routing had been established for both ground and air evacuation.
AOCG
SUBJECT: U.S. Medical Infrastructure Assessment for King Faisal Air Base Shooting

10. The absence of a rotary wing aircraft at the Base resulted in reliance on fixed wing MEDEVAC that took approximately two hours from time of injury to arrival at the King Hussein airport. Autopsy results show that no amount of medical care could have intervened in the outcome of these three Soldiers.

12. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
Exhibit 4.
Incident Medical Evacuation Storyboard
On-Site Medical Capabilities:
- Advanced Trauma Life Support
- Advanced Cardiac Life Support
- Basic Labs and Monitoring (12 EKG, Ultrasound, ISTAT)

On-Site Medical Personnel:
- US Civilian Physician’s Assistant
- USSF 18D x 2

Communications PACE:

Point of Injury to Base

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

MEDEVAC Request

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Casualty Routing:

1. Point of injury to Al-Jafr US Clinic: Ground CASEVAC
2. US Clinic to Marka Airfield: US Fixed-wing MEDEVAC
3. Marka Airfield to King Hussein Hospital: Jordanian rotary-wing MEDEVAC (Tail to Tail transfer)
Coalition Aid Station is fully stocked with emergency care supplies and narcotics. There is a person who lives on site. CASEVAC: If Coalition member is seriously injured; base will notify Company Air assets in Markah airport who fly to KFAB (~45min flight). Patient will be loaded onto AC, return back to Markah (~45min flight), then be loaded onto ambulance and driven to King Hussein Medical Center (~15min drive).
Exhibit 5.

Autopsies
Pages 24 through 41 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
Exhibit 6.

JAF Airbase Map and 4 Nov 16, Incident Diagram
Airfield

U.S. Compound

Front Gate (Location of Engagement)

To Al-Jafr

To Training Area

1 km

N

Jordanian Aid Station

Primary U.S. Aid Station

Secondary U.S. Aid Station

200m

1 km

U.S. Compound

Main Civilian Roadway

To Al-Jafr
Initiation of Engagement

Guard Shack

Sliding Gate

Jordanian Gate Cdr Office

White Picket Fence (Decorative)

Concrete Barriers

4

3

2

1

QRF Vehicle

Fence Line

Structure/Gate

Vehicle

Shooter

Camera

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
End of Engagement

Extracted from Vehicle by Jordanians and Evacuated to the Jordanian Aid Station

QRF Vehicle

Lying on Road Inside Main Gate

Vehicle 2 Driven Through White Picket Fence

Concrete Barriers

4

3

Guard Shack

Concrete Barriers

Lift Gate

Lift Gate

3

4

Link-up With USSF on Main Road

Camera

Fence Line

Structure/Gate

Vehicle

Shooter
Exhibit 7.

Jordanian Investigation report

*Withheld due to ongoing FBI investigation*
Exhibit 8.

4 Nov 16, Incident Video

*Withheld due to ongoing FBI investigation*
Exhibit 9.

Pre-Mission Training
ODA 5 Pre-Mission Training Activities

May-September 2015

- Language Training (Levantine Arabic)
- Foreign Weapons Training
- Anti-Tank Weapons Training (Karl Gustav)
- 60mm/81mm Mortar Training
- Mortar Fire Direction Center Training
- Demolitions Training
- Tactical Combat Casualty Care with Live Tissue Training
- Medical Training Concept with 101st Airborne (Air Assault)
- Small Arms Training Concept with 101st Airborne (Air Assault)

April – June 2016

- Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course
- Language Training (Levantine Arabic)

ODA 15 Pre-Mission Training Activities

1. **13-24JUL15** the team conducted a two week training exercise with approximately 170 Soldiers from the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade and taught them Small Unit Tactics (SUT), Direct Action (DA)/ Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Combat Marksmanship, Mission planning/OPORD briefings, and several mini missions that culminated in a combined final assault on two simultaneous blank fire shoot houses.

2. **14-26SEP15** the ODA conducted HAVEACE in Florida covering DA, mission planning, FRIES, and TCCC/LTT.

3. **2-6NOV15** the team went to the Mobile Threats and Targets Training and AFSOC SERE Training to learn (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)

4. **17-20NOV15** we conducted a live fire range with the M240 and Russian PKM for a machine gun qualification range and an M4 qualification range. Both weapon systems were conducted in day and night time.

5. **recertified on SOCMS from 29NOV-11DEC15.**

6. **04-07JAN16** the team conducted a three day live fire movement to contact range with M4, M240, HE grenades, and 60mm Mortars before deploying.

7. During the deployment the team conducted several live fire ranges with Russian weapons: AK-47, RGP, SPG-9, DsHKA, KPV, 80 and 120mm Mortars, Glock 19 ranges and medical scenarios.

8. **13-23SEP16** and traveled to Jordan to conduct a PDSS.
9. **19-23SEP16**

   (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) went to (b)(7)(e), (b)(7)(f)

10. In **SEP16** we conducted TCCC/LTT and several mortar and demo ranges. In-between all of these training events, the team conducted language training in both MSA and Levantine.
Exhibit 10.

ODA 535 Standard Operating Procedures
ODA 5 Notes:

5 IA Longevity:
All 35 pax were on their second four month deployment to the location and had spent apx 240 days on the base during NOV15-MAR16 and JUL16-NOV16.

Force Protection:
- Soldiers had local cell phone on their person at all times
- Soldiers operated in buddy teams whenever training off post
- Each Soldier carried a 9mm pistol w/ 3 x magazines
- While training students, each POI carried a minimum of 1 x AK47, 1 x Radio
- All off-post training was coordinated at least 24 hours prior with partner force
- Partner force provided security at all off post training sites and on-post live-fire training

ROE:
All Soldiers had the right to use whatever force necessary to defend themselves or any other Coalition forces.

Team/Camp MEDEVAC:
I. Point of Injury to CCP
   A. PI (primary) or AI (secondary) calls immediate ceasefire, gains control of students, and notifies RSO of medical emergency via radio (primary), cell phone (alternate), star cluster (contingency), and runner (emergency).
   B. Range Safety Officer calls all PIs to halt training and gain accountability of students, notifies PA and 18D of medical emergency, and alerts camp to begin preparation for appropriate MEDEVAC from camp to hospital.
   C. PA and available 18Ds move to location of medical emergency, triage casualties, stabilize casualties, and ground evacuate casualties to camp clinic (CCP). Maximum driving time from training areas to camp 30 minutes.
   D. At clinic, PA and 18Ds further evaluate and treat casualties. PA makes MEDEVAC decision.

II. CCP to Hospital
   A. (Primary) Fixed wing MEDEVAC with 18D/PA providing en route care from camp to airfield (Flight time 45 minutes). Ground MEDEVAC from airfield to hospital (average driving time 45 minutes).
   B. (Alternate) Ground MEDEVAC from camp to hospital with 18D/PA providing en route care (average driving time 2 hours and 30 minutes).
On 13-23SEP16, traveled to Jordan to conduct a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) of the camp, given tours of the facilities and frequently traveled off the base to nearby live fire ranges. Current procedures for entering the camp were as follows:

1. All vehicles would slowly approach the JAF manned checkpoint.
2. Each vehicle would pass multiple JAF soldiers manning the checkpoint either on foot, in shacks/buildings, or gun trucks.
3. Each driver would simply smile and wave a hand before being allowed to enter. No ID card checks or verbal questions were ever asked. It was assumed that the guards knew the vehicles all the instructors regularly drove and the presence of Caucasian men with beards was all the verification the guards needed.

When I spoke to the site and to the other personnel on ODA35, the CASEVAC plan was described as follows:

1. When a live fire range during training was scheduled, AC at Marka Airport would be on standby for CASEVAC. When live fire ranges were not scheduled, AC crew were not on standby and left one person at the hanger to answer phone calls.
2. In the event of a CASEVAC call, the AC crew would fly down to the base (approximately 45 min flight), pick up the casualty at the airfield, fly back to Marka (approximately another 45 min flight), casualty would then be transferred to a waiting ambulance and be driven to the King Hussein Medical Center (approximately 15 min drive), then handed over to doctors and waiting personnel.

I rose my concerns to the about such a long gap in time from the point of injury to actually seeing a doctor in the hospital (approximately 1hr and 45min best case scenario and extremely unlikely), but was told that this was the best option. Apparently there used to be JAF helo support co-located at the base, but was re-tasked to other missions deemed more important.

Force Protection Policy:
- We were not conducting offensive or defensive operations. The de facto policy was to defend your life if necessary.
- Each man carried a Glock 19 (round in chamber), with two additional magazines on our person (3 total/15 rounds per magazine)
- Each Soldier kept his AK in his room with 4-8 magazines. This was in preparation for a camp defense situation.

ROE:
- If a situation became threatening, de-escalate if possible and defend your life and the lives of fellow coalition partners if necessary.

Convoy Operations:
- We did not have any convoy formation policies. We travelled freely around camp. It was smarter to not travel alone but it was not a formal policy.
Gate procedures:
1. A driver or drivers would drive to the gate at a slower pace and stop at the first gate.
2. A Jordanian gate guard would raise the first gate and the vehicles would roll forward to the second gate and stop if the second gate was shut. If another guard had already opened the second gate the team would drive through the second gate and enter the base.
3. The guards would recognize the coalition vehicles based on their make, model and appearance.
4. No identification was required.

Duration at Site:
- arrived at camp on 3 November 2016.
- and arrived at camp on 27 October 2016
- arrived at 29 October 2016.

MEDEVAC:
- The US was lead medical person at the camp. There were two medical bays available for treatment, both stocked and prepped for TCCC.
- If evacuation was necessary, it was possible to move by vehicle (ambulance) or air to Amman. Based upon the severity of the situation the evacuation method would be determined. The air platform was a civilian plane in Amman that would be dispatched if necessary.

Security Posture at the site:
- The Jordanian gate guards positioned one Soldier in the guard shack with his rifle at the low ready. There was also a truck with an M60 machine gun mounted on top. The truck was parked 100m inside the gate and underneath a shade structure. The M60 machine gun was oriented towards the gate at incoming traffic. The truck was manned by 3 Jordanian soldiers.
- The Jordanian forces were there for our protection. If we couldn't trust them, our focus would have been entirely upon protecting ourselves, and could not have done the training mission.

Thoughts on how to prevent/mitigate future incidents:
- When the identifiable Coalition vehicles approach, the guards should sling their weapons or not be at the low ready.
- The security guards often displayed negligence for basic weapons handling and safety which could be improved in the future.
- When the students are not at the camp, the security posture of the security at the gates should be lowered. Specifically, the number of guards at the gates could be reduced to three Soldiers.
- In the future, the guards at the outer gate could have a less defensive posture in order to scale back the tensions from the 4 November 2016 incident when coalition personnel enter and exit.
Exhibit 11.
Incident Convoy US Personnel ERB's
**SWORN STATEMENT**
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2551; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

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<th>2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)</th>
<th>3. TIME</th>
<th>4. FILE NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Prince Faisal Airbase, Jaf, Jordan</td>
<td>20161104</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME**

**6. SSN**

**7. GRADE/STATUS**

**8. ORGANIZATION/ADDRESS**

**9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:**

On 04Nov16, I returned to the airbase after conducting offsite training at approximately 1115. I drove to the ASP with [REDACTED] to unload trash and damage. At approximately 1130, a U.S. support officer drove quickly into the ASP and yelled "American are down at the front gate." [REDACTED] and I jumped into our vehicles and drove to the front gate of the JAF airbase. I contacted [REDACTED] enroute to the gate and he stated that he was in a convoy stuck outside of the gate. [REDACTED] stated that there were American vehicles shot at the gate and JAF soldiers would not let him approach. [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] and informed him of the situation. [REDACTED] moved from the U.S. camp to the JAF gate. I approached the gate slowly down the main street coming from the direction of the JAF headquarters. As I approached, a JAF truck was staged at the interior of the gate with its machine gun pointed towards my vehicle. I flashed my lights and a second JAF vehicle flashed its lights in return so I continued my approach to the gate. As I neared the gate I saw a JAF land cruiser driving from the direction of the gate with a JAF soldier lying in the bed of the truck with noticeable wounds and I exited our vehicles and walked slowly towards the gate while [REDACTED] grabbed his medical gear. There were several JAF soldiers yelling and trying to give orders. At this time I noticed two American vehicles parked on the inside of the gate with multiple bullet holes through the vehicles. The lead vehicle had a piece of wood sticking out of the radiator and the second vehicle had driven up the curb. [REDACTED] was lying on the road next to the second vehicle with [REDACTED].

It appeared to look like [REDACTED] but he also suffered from multiple gunshot wounds. At this point, [REDACTED] began talking with the JAF and personnel and I moved with [REDACTED] towards the front gate. On approach to the gate I saw a third vehicle parked in between the inner and outer gates. Once I reached the front gate, we saw several JAF soldiers with weapons acting hysterically claiming that they were fired upon. [REDACTED] and I saw [REDACTED] lying face down along the main road approximately 20 meters from his vehicle. I contacted [REDACTED] on the radio and he stated that JAF soldiers had weapons pointed at the American convoy located outside of camp and were taking warning shots whenever any American approached even with their hands raised. I moved inside the camp and contacted the JAF to assist in getting inside the camp and getting the American vehicles which were currently stranded outside the camp. Personnel to the gate to direct the American vehicles back onto the camp and all vehicles made it safely through the gates. After all of the vehicles made it onto the compound, I moved back up to check on [REDACTED] and his body was already recovered and was evacuated to the American aid station. At that point, I assisted [REDACTED] in recovering [REDACTED] body which was placed in a JAF ambulance and evacuated to the American aid station. Prior to leaving the area, [REDACTED] and I directed [REDACTED] to take control of the down vehicles and all of the weapons and equipment inside. I then drove my vehicle behind [REDACTED] towards the American aid station. Prior to reaching the American camp, our convoy was waved down by JAF soldiers in front of the JAF aid station. The soldiers claimed that there was one American and one Jordanian soldier wounded inside the aid station.

**10. EXHIBIT**

**11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT**

**ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"**

**THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.**

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE

APD LC V1.01EB
STATEMENT OF ____________________

TAKEN AT ____________________

DATED ____________________

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

and I entered the aid station and saw a stretcher being treated by JAF medical personnel. I

stayed in the JAF aid station to provide medical care to patients. After that I moved back to the American camp to direct

all personnel. At that time ____________________

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

which was being treated by the JAF medical personnel. I approached ____________________ to
class=\"\" conduct a

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

The JAF aid station did not have the appropriate supplies to conduct a

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

so ____________________ was immediately moved to the JAF ambulance

for transportation to the American aid station. Inside the ambulance

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

After I attracted the attention of a JAF officer, a JAF driver was instructed
to drive the ambulance to the American aid station. I helped move the

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

I continued to

At approximately 1255, ____________________ continued to

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

with the support of one Italian personnel. At approximately 1245, ____________________ was packaged and evacuated to the air field. At that time,

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

After ____________________ and ____________________ were moved to the

airfield I assisted in administrative tasks.

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, ____________________, ____________________, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENduring THE STATEMENT MADE

BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE

CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT

THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUSTR

(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to

administer oaths, this day of ____________________, at ____________________

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(p)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2551; E.O. 9375 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Prince Faisal Airbase, Jafra, Jordan

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
20161104

3. TIME
1600

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

6. SSN
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SFOD-A (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

9. AUTHORIZE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I, (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

At approximately 1130 local time on 04 NOV 2016, I returned to Al-Jafra Air Base from the D8 range. I entered the base following

There was an unusually long delay before the gate guard acknowledged us and opened the gate for us.

Once on the installation, we drove straight to the ASP where I parked the Land Cruiser pickup I had driven to the range. Afterward, I sat in the ASP with [redacted] and [redacted] waiting on the remainder of the group, which departed D8 after us, to return. After approximately 10 minutes, they rushed over in a truck and notified us that there was an incident involving

Americans at the gate.

and I each jumped into our own vehicles and drove straight to the front gate.

I exited our vehicles beside the large white building located to the right of the main gate as you enter the base, and I drove forward in my Land Cruiser Ambulance stopping approximately 30 meters before the gate. As

I exited our vehicles, there was a lot of unintelligible yelling coming from the JAF soldiers at the gate. We raised our hands and moved cautiously towards them. While doing so, 2 Jordanian ambulances arrived at the scene and stopped behind the ambulance.

I moved behind the first Jordanian ambulance while we tried to figure out what was happening. From where we stood, looking towards the gate, there was a body laying on the side of the road in front of us, and to the left. He was clearly dead.

To our right was a white Land Cruiser pick-up. There were several bullet holes in the windshield of the driver’s side of the vehicle. A piece of wood was sticking out of the grill and fluids were dripping from the engine compartment onto the ground. About 2 meters behind us, there was a small pile of brass and disintegrated links (used to hold rounds together on a belt-fed weapon). While behind the vehicle, and I were approached by a Jordanian officer who told us to stay in place because there was still shooting going on outside the base and that he didn’t have a good grasp on what was actually happening. Around this time, I heard approximately 3 or 4 shots being fired; it sounded as though they came from east of the gate. At this point the Jordanian officer left and directed JAF soldiers to move the ambulance to try

clear the road, then arrived on the scene with [redacted] and [redacted] and I explained what we knew of the situation to him and showed him the body. At this point, I explained that the vehicles outside the base were ours and that they needed to be brought back in. A few minutes later, I told them that the road had been cleared. I tried to radio the

who was outside the base with the others Americans to notify him that the road had been cleared. I was unable to reach him with my Motorola. While trying to make contact by radio, I heard my name being yelled from

behind by [redacted]. They told me to get inside the ambulance. When I did, I saw [redacted] was already inside and that [redacted] was laying on a stretcher unconscious. Two Jordanians drove the ambulance to the U.S. clinic while

and I tried to identify the wounds on [redacted]. Upon arrival at the clinic, I helped

and

carry [redacted] inside. At that point, I continued to work as a runner gathering any supplies that the medics needed

from inside the camp.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____.

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2

I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIATED ALL CORRECTIONS AND INITIATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT

I DECLARE UNDER PAIN OF PERJURY UNDER THE PLEDGE OF THE OATH OR AFFIRMATION THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY ME IS TRUE AND I HAVE INITIATED ALL CORRECTIONS AND INITIATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[Signature of Person Making Statement]

[Date]

[Signature of Person Administering Oath]
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Prince Faisal Airbase, Jafra, Jordan

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
20161104

3. TIME
1415

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

6. SSN

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SFOD-A

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 04NOV16 I was returning from training in a convoy of American vehicles. I was in vehicle 1, I was alone in vehicle 2, and (b)(6) was alone in vehicle 3. All three vehicles approached the gate to JAF air base and everything was fine. The JAF soldier opened the external draw gate and we pulled past the draw gate into the section between the external and internal gate. The internal gate was closed so all three vehicle sat in line waiting to enter the camp. The guard at the guard shack immediately opened fire with an AK47 into the cabin of the first vehicle from less than 10 feet away. (b)(3) and I jumped out of our vehicles and moved behind the cement barriers next to our trucks. I saw the guard shooting into the truck and I shot him. He started to maneuver onto our position. (b)(3) was yelling in Arabic to the guard shooting and the guard at the exterior lift gate that we were Americans and we were friendly. Every time we put our hands or heads up above the barrier the guard fired upon us and hit the barriers. I communicated with (b)(3) and we decided to attempt to shoot at the guard effectively since he was not interesting in talking and I bounded back together past the first lift gate to more cement barriers. The guard continued to fire upon us and he moved onto our position. He quickly approached my barrier, turned the corner and shot (b)(3). I stood up and fired a complete magazine of my Glock at the guard. The guard fell to the ground and I kicked his AK47 away. I moved back to the guard at the exterior lift gate and made him drop his rifle. I grabbed the guard and made him move with me back towards the vehicles located on the main road outside of the gate. I saw the barrel truck which was at the range with us and the soldiers were calling for me to come to their location. Once I arrived at the barrel truck a black Hilux with (b)(3) pulled up and I jumped into their vehicle. I told them what had happened and we tried to approach the gate. As our vehicle moved towards the gate, JAF soldiers took up defensive positions and took 1 shot towards our direction. We stayed at that location with the barrel truck until (b)(3) called us and secured the gate from inside. We drove through the gate quickly and went to the aid station. I assisted in the aid station then provided aid to (b)(3) until they were evacuated.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF______ TAKEN AT______ DATED______

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.
**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-48; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

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<td>20161104</td>
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<th>5. LAST NAME</th>
<th>6. FIRST NAME</th>
<th>7. MIDDLE NAME</th>
<th>8. SSN</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:**

At approximately 1200 on 04 NOV 2016 I was returning to Al Jafir Air Base after a familiarization range with the incoming ODA. The incoming were in my vehicle and we took a detour on our way back so I could show him another training area (Range D26). All the other vehicles in our convoy took the normal route straight back to the base. After the recon of the other training area I returned to the base to enter at the front gate. We were approximately five minutes behind the other trainers and we were the last vehicle from the ranges.

As we approached the front gate of Al Jafir Air Base from the West we were stopped by our Jordanian range security counterparts, who were also returning from the range, approximately 200m short of the entrance. They were parked in the middle of the road and out of their vehicle waving us down. They were very agitated and told us to move back with our lights on. I backed up about 25m. I could see a lot of activity at the gate and was trying to identify what was going on. At this time I heard a few gunshots at the gate. who had already entered the base, called on the radio and informed me that something was going on at the gate. I informed him I was located near the gate and was trying to find out what was going on. I could see multiple Jordanian gate guards with guns raised but I did not know the situation. I saw two white land cruisers parked in the space between the outer and inner gates with the doors open, but I could not identify if they were the coalition vehicles or if they were vehicles.

At this time we noticed someone running towards us from the gate and as he got closer we identified him as . He approached our vehicle and told us that a gate guard had opened fire on them and that they had shot a gate guard. At this time I put a NET call on the radio that we may have U.S. personnel down at the front gate. I also called by phone to inform him of what was going on and to bring out the JAF personnel at the front gate to stand down.

We then tried to approach the gate in the vehicle but the personnel in front of us would not let us through. We continued to try to push towards the front gate and eventually drove past the checkpoint. This allowed us to drive towards the front gate. Once we drove up to the truck and we took cover behind our vehicle. climbed in the passenger side of the vehicle and got into the driver seat. He backed up the truck with the vehicle using it as cover. Once they backed it up about 20m and I entered the vehicle and drove it back to our original stopping point behind the Road. I then realized that the JAF soldiers recognized us as the one who had just shot them on their own so I proceeded cautiously with letting him in and through the gate.

About this time the were showing up at the inside of the gate and I was in communication with them trying to get them to gain control of the JAF soldiers at the gate. From the outside it looked like they began to evacuate the wounded and they moved the U.S. vehicles opening up the gate.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _______ TAKEN AT ______ DATED _______. THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE MAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.
Once the JAF gate guards would not fire on us we moved by vehicle with the outside element that we were with through the gate. I drove through quickly and returned directly to our camp on the base. About this time put out a radio call that we had one U.S. KIA. I instructed [REDACTED] not to leave the camp because the Jordanians knew what he looked like. I then moved in to our camp and saw the [REDACTED] working on [REDACTED]. He had multiple bullet wounds to [REDACTED] and they had about 5 personnel working on him. They didn't need any help at that time so I attempted to get accountability of the ODA pax. After discussion with the [REDACTED] we realized we were still missing [REDACTED] I radioed [REDACTED] who were returning from the front gate and they were being flagged down and stopped at the JAF clinic and found [REDACTED] being treated there [REDACTED] stayed with [REDACTED] and moved him to an ambulance and then moved him to our clinic. Once we had [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the clinic all hands were on deck with the PA, three 18Ds, a former 18D and some coalition medics. We began to prep vehicles to move them to the airfield as the MEDEVAC plane was in the air. As the plane was approaching we packaged and transported [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to the airfield. At approximately 1340 they were loaded in the plane. We sent the PA, 2 x 18Ds and [REDACTED] with the injured personnel on the plane.

-----

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 2. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or inducement.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:
Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 8397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:
To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES:
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DISCLOSURE:
Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Prince Faisal Airbase, Jaf, Jordan

2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)
20161104

3. TIME
1400

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

6. SSN
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SFOD-A
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

After the morning range on 04 November 2016 everyone was going back to base. I was riding with _______ and he was showing me range areas, so we were behind the main group. As we approached the main gate of the base we saw the trucks stopped in the road a little short of the gate. The _______ soldiers were waving at us to stop so we did. I heard gunshots come over the radio and told _______ that he thought something was happening. I could see three white trucks stopped between the external lift gate and the internal sliding gate. I then saw a man in black pants, t-shirt, and baseball cap crouched behind a berm. He kept putting his hands up in the air and looked like he was yelling and wanting to run. I was too far away to identify who it was but I was yelling at us to move even further away and we were very upset because we did not leave like they wanted. We backed up a little then moved up because we wanted to know what was going on and make sure none of our guys were involved. We saw the man in black running towards us with his hands in the air. I realized that the man in black was _______ so I drove right up to the trucks, ran by with my hands up and jumped into our truck. I told us that we had guys down. I do not know the exact time line, but I was talking to _______ on the radio during this giving him updates, telling him to get to the gate with _______ and that we needed a MEDEVAC. We kept trying to move up to the gate to work on any of our guys that were hurt and kept stopping us. I saw JAF open the interior gate and move two of the U.S. trucks that had been shot through the gate onto camp. Finally, let us go around them. We stopped just short of the first gate and got out because it was lowered. We moved around to the passenger side of the truck and we were looking to make sure the area was safe before we walked up. We heard gunshots and got down. We did not shoot our Glocks. I did not shoot because I did not know which Jordanian soldiers were for us or against us. I did not know the situation and did not want to escalate it. There was a JAF soldier bouldering and maneuvering on us. I said that they were moving on us, got down behind a berm behind us, and I knew that it was in a better position and wanted to move to him but we could see a JAF soldier with his rifle up aiming towards us. I climbed through the front passenger door and across into the driver's seat, said that he was going to ground guide and to just go. I was able to try and stay low and stayed low and talked over to the side of the berm that was at _______. We started moving beside the truck like _______ was. We moved back to a safe distance and was on the radio talking. Finally we got the call on the radio that we were clear to drive to base. We drove through the gate showing our hands. I believe most of the gate guards had left. I only saw a few. We drove to base. I saw _______ dead on the ground as we drove by inside of the gate.

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _______ TAKEN AT _______ DATED _______"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.
AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6) ____________________________, have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 2. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. The statement is true. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ______ day of ______, ______ at ______.

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
Prince Faisal Airbase, Jaf, Jordan

2. DATE (YY/MM/DD)
201611104

3. TIME
1900

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

6. SSN
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SFOD-A
(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 04NOV2016, I was returning from conducting range activities at approximately 1120. I passed through the front gate of the base without issue. I was traveling in a convoy of 5 or 6 cars with a mix of Military and Non-Military personal. I arrived at the ASP and downloaded all weapons and equipment from the range. After I had finished, I sat down to wait for the rest of the personal to return from the range. At that time I was co-located with [Redacted] and [Redacted]. The squad rapidly entered the ASP and yelled that there were Americans down at the front gate. I was the first one to get to my vehicle, an ambulance, and drove rapidly towards the front gate. I decided to check and see if the personal had been taken to the Clinic, as it would only add a few seconds to my travel time either way and I had no radio with me. Seeing that there were no vehicles at the clinic I took a back route to the gate, which intersects with the main road near the front gate. I could see immediately upon turning onto the main road that there were several shot up vehicles and at least one injured person lying prone approx. 5-10 meters inside the sleeping interior gate. I had my emergency lights on and was waved forward by several Jordanians near the front gate. Not knowing that fire was taken from the JAF guards, I pulled my ambulance between the injured patient, [Redacted] and the area gate for cover. I believe that I was the first American to arrive who was not involved in the immediate incident. Upon exiting my vehicle I could see that the patient was American and I triaged him as expectant, due to obviously fatal trauma. It appeared that he had been pulled from the truck post mortem due to his positioning and injury. I strapped on my aid bag, pulled out my pistol, and moved around the rear of my ambulance running towards the guard shack. I began asking the Jordanians (I do not know if they were or JAF personal) where the fire was coming from and if there were more injured outside the gate. I was told that the fire was coming from outside the camp and there were two more injured men. I moved toward the exterior lift gate using the line of shot up trucks as cover. I could see there was a [Redacted] "barrel truck" and an American vehicle on the road to the West outside the gate. I saw a patient motionless on the ground beside a Jersey barrier, but I couldn't identify him from my position. I heard gunshots, which I thought to be from an assault rifle, from the East, towards my general vicinity. A kinsman, who I recognized from training, ran out to me and, in Arabic, said that Machine gun fire was getting the patient because only Americans were being targeted. I returned inside the interior sliding gate and was able to link up with [Redacted] Together we returned to the guard shack and [Redacted] identified the patient was [Redacted]. Upon learning it was , we attempted to exit the interior gate to retrieve him, but we were fired on again from the East and returned to cover. We were told, by [Redacted], to stay inside the gate and that [Redacted] was going to retrieve him. We immediately loaded [Redacted] in the back of the Jordanian Ambulance after he was brought inside the interior gate by [Redacted] accompanied me during the movement to the Aid Station. We began to assess his medical condition during the 90 sec ride to the Aid Station. He was [Redacted] identified several gunshot wounds to his Upon arrival at the Aid Station, I continued to provide medical care for [Redacted]. When [Redacted] arrived at the Aid Station I assisted in giving him an IV. I immediately returned and provided constant medical attention to [Redacted] until the AIREVAC arrived. We transported the patients by pickup to the Air Strip

10. EXHIBIT

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

During this movement we were accompanied by a transport and I loaded the patients on the plane and continued to provide medical care for and linked up with [redacted] in the ER. Upon arriving to KHMC I was informed that [redacted] had passed. Shortly after that [redacted] was also pronounced dead. I provided the medical staff at KHMC with medical details and a rough timeline to assist with proper medical documentation [redacted] and I each accompanied our respective teammates by ground transport back to Marka Airbase in separate Jordanian Ambulances. I then waited with [redacted] remains until [redacted] arrived to transport him.

AFFIDAVIT

I [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2, I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

[redacted] 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS:

[redacted] 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT:

[redacted] 10 U.S.C. 130b, (b)(6)
**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

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**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

<table>
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<th>1. LOCATION</th>
<th>2. DATE (YYYY/MM/DD)</th>
<th>3. TIME</th>
<th>4. FILE NUMBER</th>
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<tr>
<td>Prince Faisal Airbase, Jaf, Jordan</td>
<td>20161104</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME**

6. **SSN**

7. **GRADE/STATUS**

9. 1. **ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 4 November 2016, at approximately 1150 local, I was in the camp dining facility, after returning from the range outside of Al Jafar Air Base. At that moment [redacted] came running in to inform me that there was some type of problem at the front gate of the air base and he said Americans may be hurt. I told [redacted] to go [redacted] and inform headquarters in Amman that an incident involving Americans had taken place and I will update him via radio. After this I informed the Camp that something was going on at the front gate and we potentially had injured American. To get his stuff together and meet me at the front gate of the air base.

At 1201 I received a phone call from [redacted] who informed me that he and [redacted] were outside of the base. He said he was stopped approximately 200m from the gate and would not let him pass. I stated that there appeared to be something going on at the front gate but he could not say exactly what was happening.

I got our [redacted] and [redacted] to go with me to the front gate of the base and find out what was going on. As we drove up to the front gate of the base I noticed multiple JAF and [redacted] personnel there, along with several vehicles [redacted] called me on the radio around this time and stated he had been shot at by JAF as they tried to enter the base.

After I exited the vehicle I noticed a body lying on the ground and one of our white Toyota Landcruiser pickup trucks we used at the range earlier that morning. The pickup truck had a white 2x4 stick in the radiator and multiple bullet holes in the windshield that I [redacted].

I moved up toward the front gate to coordinate for our guys outside the base to come inside. At this time I linked up with [redacted] and [redacted] who said they had arrived on the scene a few minutes before. I identified the body lying on the ground as [redacted] who said [redacted] was KIA.

I informed [redacted] via radio to not attempt to drive up to the gate anymore and [redacted] was coordinating with JAF to allow them to come in. The [redacted] informed me that two bodies, one JAF and one American had been taken to the base aid station.

I recovered [redacted] and we placed [redacted] in a JAF ambulance for transport to our Camp aid station. [redacted] stayed with [redacted] and began providing medical aid. They arrived and informed me that [redacted] was KIA and [redacted] was taking [redacted] to the Camp aid station.

I immediately departed and went back to the Camp aid station and placed [redacted] in a JAF ambulance for transport to the American Camp. At this point I was able to coordinate with JAF and they allowed our element outside the base to come back inside. After all personnel were inside the base and it was determined that no Americans were located at the gate I told the [redacted] with me to leave guards behind so they could pull security on our three vehicles left at the front gate.

I drove back to camp with [redacted] following behind. As we approached the base aid station I asked one of the medics outside if there was an American inside. After the medics stated there was an American inside [redacted] and I went in. Upon entering the room I identified [redacted] and one injured JAF soldier laying on stretchers next to each other.

**ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ______ TAKEN AT ______ DATED _______.**

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APD LC v1.01 ES
9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I went to [redacted] and told him he was going to be fine and we would take care of him. [redacted] said he was going to stay with [redacted] until we could get him to our Camp aid station.

And I went to our Camp aid station to inform [redacted] there was another wounded American, [redacted] and we were going to have him transported to the Camp aid station. [redacted] was brought to the Camp aid station approximately 10 min later. [redacted] 2 18Ds, one former 18D, one contractor 18D, and coalition medics provided care to [redacted] and [redacted] in the Camp aid station until they were transported via Casa aircraft to Marka Airfield at approximately 1330. A [redacted] aircraft arrived later that afternoon to pick up [redacted] body. [redacted]
Exhibit 13.

King Faisal Air Base Access Control Point Approach photograph
Exhibit 14.

King Faisal Air Base Access Control Point Guard Shack photograph
Shooter’s initial position when he deliberately fired upon Veh #2 through concealed side window at the closest distance as vehicle passed by guard building.